# Department of State cp

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#### The United States federal government should substantially increase its security assistance with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in artificial intelligence by

#### Establishing a 10-year roadmap for upgrading data interoperability.

#### A set of definitions over how AI should be used.

#### Create a process for collecting technical and policy knowledge from international interactions with AI.

#### Using the Department of State instead of the Department of Defense solves best

Bergmann and Schmitt 21,

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U.S. security assistance is broken and in need of an overhaul. Over the past two decades, the bureaucratic system developed to deliver billions of dollars of military aid to partner nations has evolved and expanded not by design but as the result of a series of ad hoc legislative and policy changes. Though the U.S. Department of State was initially in charge of security assistance policy and accounts, since 9/11, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) has established a separate, well-funded security assistance bureaucracy at the Pentagon. This has inhibited effective congressional oversight, harmed coordination between diplomacy and defense, and contributed to the growing militarization of U.S. foreign policy. It has created a dysfunctional and bifurcated security assistance system. Under the current security assistance system, the returns on America’s security investments are limited, inconsistent, and not strategic. The consequences of today’s broken system include increased reliance on the military to solve foreign policy challenges; a perpetuated status quo whereby nondemocratic partners receive U.S. assistance and where human rights abuses are ignored; and an ineffective and unwieldy bureaucracy. This matters because the United States depends on capable allies and partners as a core component of its national security strategy, but the current system is not suited to the task. A new administration can change this by embracing wholesale reform of the security assistance system. To do so, however, a Biden-Harris administration must move quickly to work with Congress and include such reforms in any effort to rebuild and revive U.S. diplomacy. This will require talking not only about security assistance authorities, but fundamentally about money and resources as well. Any reform efforts intending to bolster the role of the State Department must start by examining how funding is oriented and balanced between the departments. This necessitates close cooperation with the Hill. There must be a dramatic realignment of U.S. security assistance. This report provides an overview and a systemic critique of the current bureaucratic structure of U.S. security assistance and outlines how transferring resources and responsibilities for security assistance back to the State Department will better advance U.S. interests and address the current geopolitical challenges America confronts. It calls for reviving the centrality of diplomacy by restoring the State Department’s role, as originally intended under U.S. law, as the overseer of all U.S. foreign assistance. It also offers recommendations for expanding and training the security assistance workforce, improving interagency coordination, elevating human rights concerns in security assistance policy, and adapting best practices from the DOD. Specifically, this report calls for transferring the following programs and funding from the DOD to the State Department: The relatively newly created Section 333 train and equip authority, which replicates the State Department’s Foreign Military Financing (FMF) authority The DOD’s security assistance authorities that focus on long-term security force reform to the State Department, including the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, the Counter-Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) Train and Equip Fund, and the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative fund This would result in a roughly $7 billion transfer, significantly augmenting the State Department’s budget and capacity to guide security assistance policy. Putting the State Department back in charge of security assistance will be a major reform and will require significant operational changes within the department, as well as a dramatic expansion of its administrative capacity. This will take time to implement and require significant reform within the agency. The DOD has done an admirable job in setting up a new institutional structure, in implementing assistance, and in coordinating with the State Department. However, officials across the U.S. foreign policy world acknowledge that the system is not working. Tommy Ross, a former DOD official in charge of overseeing the Pentagon’s security assistance, recently argued that U.S. security assistance is “not fit for purpose” and is “out of sync with U.S. priorities when it comes to where resources are needed most and the types of capabilities required by America’s allied and partners.”1 Indeed, throughout much of the last decade, it has been DOD officials who publicly argued for increased funding for the State Department.2 Ultimately, the current bifurcated security assistance system is suboptimal and results in the bureaucratic diminishment of the State Department relative to the military considerations of the DOD. Transferring resources and responsibility to the State Department would centralize responsibility for foreign aid under diplomatic control, while improving interagency cooperation, as DOD would remain the primary implementer of U.S. assistance. Some of these ideas will likely be met with innate skepticism from a generation of security professionals whose experience in Washington has been characterized by an ever-withering State Department and an ever-strengthening Pentagon. This report anticipates and rebuts likely arguments against reform, including the capacity of the State Department to take on this responsibility, the benefits of the Pentagon’s current management, or the unnecessary disruption that would result from significant bureaucratic change laid out in this proposal. Failing to reform security assistance not only leaves the United States with a wasteful and inefficient status quo, it also perpetuates the marginalization of diplomacy and locks in the military’s newly found dominance in driving U.S. foreign policy. The current security assistance system evolved to address the threats posed by the post-9/11 era and is now outdated and ill-suited for a new geopolitical environment characterized by competition. If the next administration is to revive U.S. diplomacy and rebuild the State Department, it must empower the agency to oversee and direct foreign assistance. The Biden-Harris administration should seize the opportunity to work with a new Congress to reform the system from its first days in office and restore an effective tool in the U.S. foreign policy arsenal. A new security assistance system, centralized and coordinated within the State Department, would allow the United States to wield its security assistance more effectively and responsibly in today’s competitive geopolitical environment. Arms transfers, training, and support could also better support U.S. foreign policy goals, in particular bolstering democratic partners and emerging democracies, making them stronger U.S. partners to counter threats from authoritarian actors. Empowering the State Department to oversee and manage security assistance would also ensure that aid is used to advance a values-based foreign policy that respects and supports human rights.3 It would also give U.S. diplomats greater clout and leverage and potentially create greater coherence to the provision of foreign assistance overall. The result would be to strengthen a key tool in the U.S. foreign policy toolbox and increase the clout and authority of America’s diplomats, which is badly needed in this new era of geopolitical competition.

## Perm

### Do the cp – assistance vs cooperation

#### “Security cooperation” requires the Department of Defense. The counterplan’s “security assistance” is administered by the Department of State.

Kerr 18, Visiting Research Fellow at the National Defense University (NDU) in the Center for Complex Operations (Alexandra, “Defense Institution Building in the U.S. Context,” *Connections*, 17.3)

Finally, in the U.S. government, “security cooperation” and “security assistance”—which are the chief lines of effort in the U.S. toolkit to help partners bolster their security and work with the United States to support common security objectives—are overlapping but not necessarily interchangeable. The distinction between “security cooperation” and “security assistance” activities has to do with the agency administering the program: in simplest terms, it is either an activity of the Department of Defense (security cooperation) or the Department of State (security assistance). DOD and the Department of State (DOS) have shared responsibility for engaging with foreign partner militaries since the mid-twentieth century, with the bulk of congressional security assistance funding allocated to DOS. Any security assistance administered by DOD—whether funded under Title 10 (Armed Services) or Title 22 (Foreign Affairs) of the U.S. Code—is a “security cooperation” activity.[21] After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the legal framework for the funding and administration of such activities evolved in response to emerging threats. Congress increasingly granted funding and authorities directly to DOD under Title 10 for security cooperation.[22] Therefore, while DOS security assistance programs can include DIB components, the majority of DIB-specific programming is currently funded under and implemented by the Department of Defense and is thus considered security cooperation.

#### Security Cooperation is administered by the DoD, Security Assistance is DoS

McLaren 14, US Air Force Captain (McKay, “Enhancing the Assessment of the Costs and Benefits of International Pilot Training (IPT) Within the U.S. Air Force: Is It Worth It?,” RAND Dissertations)

U.S. Code Title 22 provides congressional authority to conduct DoS Security Assistance programs. The programs are carried out through two basic laws, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA) and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (AECA).24 AECA enacted congressional legislative controls over export of defense articles and services. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee are responsible for foreign assistance and Security Assistance program authorization legislation. The Senate and House Armed Services Committees are responsible for defense programs authorization legislation. The term security cooperation is used within DoD, whereas the term security assistance is used within the DoS. It is important to note that these congressional committees play a role only in FMS authorization. Although Congress maintains legislative control over exports, FMS is a nonappropriated program, external to the U.S. budget, and the president is charged with signing off on spending for the program. Through Executive Order 11958, as amended, the President delegates selected functions in the AECA to the secretaries of State and Defense. They are required to provide reports to Congress and obtain specific congressional approval on certain exports or transfers. The DoS has responsibilities relating to security assistance, which include managing the export of defense articles, services, training, and military technology.25 DoD has responsibilities relating to security cooperation, which include activities to encourage and enable international partners to work with the United States to achieve strategic objectives.26 The military departments and other DoD agencies involved in managing FMS programs are collectively called implementing agencies (IAs). The Army, Navy, and Air Force usually have the responsibility of being the IA in the process of FMS.27 The Air Force agency for all security cooperation programs is the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force for International Affairs (SAF/IA). The Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition has oversight in the execution by virtue of having responsibility for Air Force acquisition. SAF/IA is supported by the Air Force Security Assistance Center at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, for most FMS and other logistics functions. The Air Force Security Assistance Training (AFSAT) squadron at Randolph Air Force Base (AFB), Texas, is in charge of planning and, with AETC, managing the Air Force international military training. It is organized under the authority of AETC.

#### The State Department implements Assistance, the Department of Defense implements Security Cooperation

Tankel 20, associate professor at American University, and an adjunct senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security, and Tommy Ross, non-resident senior associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020, (“RETOOLING U.S. SECURITY SECTOR ASSISTANCE,” *War on the Rocks*, <https://warontherocks.com/2020/10/reforming-u-s-security-sector-assistance-for-great-power-competition/>, (accessed 5-21-2022)

The United States provides security sector assistance to foreign civilian and military forces, agencies, and institutions ranging from local law enforcement and judicial systems to standing militaries. This assistance is intended to strengthen U.S. access to key territories and facilities, shape partners’ national security decision-making and governance, and build their capacity and capabilities for use against shared threats and adversaries. It also promotes the U.S. defense industry via arms transfers, supports the infrastructure and operations of multilateral organizations such as NATO, and increases military interoperability. The State Department implements assistance across the entire security sector, including organizations responsible for defense, law enforcement, and security of key assets like ports and borders. The Department of Defense has a narrower mandate, and provides assistance to partner militaries under the umbrella of security cooperation. The Pentagon also engages in a range of other activities — combined exercises, staff talks, port visits, and officer exchanges — that fall under security cooperation as well. We use the term security sector assistance for simplicity, and distinguish where these additional security cooperation activities are relevant. The U.S. government does not typically define Foreign Military Sales as assistance, but we believe it should, and that it ought to factor Direct Commercial Sales into its assistance planning as well. Both types of sales can lead to sustained U.S. engagement with a partner in the form of training, maintenance, and sustainment for the purchased items.

#### Any other interpretation is derived from, and causes, confusion

Tecott 21, PhD in Political Science @ MIT (Rachel, “The Cult of the Persuasive: The U.S. Military’s Aversion to Coercion in Security Assistance,” Proquest Dissertations)

There is confusion in the lexicon around Security Force Assistance (SFA). SFA, security assistance, security cooperation (SC), building partner capacity (BPC), foreign internal defense (FID), defense institution building (DIB), train-and-equip, advise-and-assist, and by-with-andthrough all refer to efforts by one nation to improve the capacity of another nation’s security sector. Within the United States government, these terms are attached to different legal authorities, different funding sources, and different strictures with respect to the agencies— civilian or military—responsible for implementation. The terms refer to an eclectic set of activities, ranging from educational programs like the International Military Education and Training Program (IMET), to personnel exchanges, to unit-level training, to unit-level advising, to wholesale efforts to build militaries from scratch. The byzantine nature of security assistance and security cooperation terminology, authorities, agencies, and activities has caused confusion and sparked criticism among the growing community of policymakers and scholars trying to better track it, understand it, and improve it.17 This study uses interchangeably the terms security assistance and Security Force Assistance (SFA), defined by U.S. Army Field Manual 3-07.1 as “the unified action to generate, employ, and sustain local, host-nation, or regional security forces in support of a legitimate authority.”18 SFA technically refers to efforts to build the entire security sector of a partner— including their police, National Guard, and gendarme. This study focuses, however, exclusively on efforts by the United States to build the partner’s military (the largest subset of SFA activities), and excludes analysis of efforts to build non-military security forces.19 SFA, in turn, is the largest subset of SC, which refers to “all Department of Defense interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote U.S. security interests.”20

### Do the cp – prefer our interp

#### Given that basically any activity is included, the only functional limit on the topic has to come at the agent-level

Mazarr 22, senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation. Previously he worked at the U.S. National War College, where he was professor and associate dean of academics; as president of the Henry L. Stimson Center; senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies; senior defense aide on Capitol Hill; and as a special assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Michael, “Security Cooperation in a Strategic Competition,” RAND, <https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA650-1.html>)

To pursue this analysis, we first had to define the bounds of what we would assess. Official U.S. government definitions of security cooperation are very broad. One definition from the Defense Security Cooperation Agency states that security cooperation

comprises all activities undertaken by the Department of Defense (DoD) to encourage and enable international partners to work with the United States to achieve strategic objectives. It includes all DoD interactions with foreign defense and security establishments, including all DoD-administered Security Assistance (SA) programs, that build defense and security relationships; promote specific U.S. security interests, including all international armaments cooperation activities and SA activities; develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations; and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to host nations.3

Such definitions clearly include almost any security-related activity for any purpose. To scope the focus of the study, we reviewed official state documents and strategies and the literature on security cooperation to identify 11 types of activities:

1. military aid, which includes funding through the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program, the Excess Defense Articles program, and other grants and loans

2. arms sales and transfers,4 such as U.S. arms sales through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) programs

3. military capacity-building, such as U.S. activities under Section 1206 of the annual National Defense Authorization Act and Sections and 2282 and 333 of U.S. Code, Title 10 (the train and equip authority)

4. education and training, including international military education and training (IMET), professional military education (PME), and regional centers

5. personnel exchanges, such as U.S. activities under the Military Personnel Exchange Program and the State Partnership Program

6. military exercises, both bilateral and multilateral and those that involve foreign partners

7. access-related agreements, such as status of forces agreements (SOFAs) and agreements related to base access and information-sharing

8. armament-related agreements, such as those for co-development of systems and for research, development, test, and evaluation activities

9. sustainment of donor-nation equipment by the donor, the partner, or third parties

10. institutional capacity–building to strengthen the partner institutions that support security services

11. humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR), which offers support for efforts to relieve suffering.

These categories offered a consistent template for gathering data across our various study components. A major challenge was that reliable and consistent data on each of the 11 categories were not available for all the competitors—not even for the United States. Especially at the unclassified level, there is simply no comprehensive roster of security cooperation activities by the United States, and neither China nor Russia publishes inclusive data sets of its programs. An additional challenge was that, in some cases, the different countries define the categories somewhat differently, so we could not develop data on entirely comparable sets of security cooperation activities.

### Do the cp – cooperation -> DoD

#### Security Cooperation requires the DoD to be the source of funding

Fenell 11, Captain, US Marine Corps, In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree MASTER OF ARTS in INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, at the UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO (Nathan, “Security Cooperation Poorly Defined” December, <https://repository.usfca.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&article=1020&context=thes>)

Security cooperation is a compilation of financial, educational, and material resources, that at their foundation are supported by the United States, in particular the Department of Defense, and are used to support the peaceful development of democracies in foreign countries. The resources provided by the Department of Defense are available to foreign countries after the host nation requests the peaceful assistance of the U.S. military in response to systemic deficiencies in the bureaucratic management of a nation state or when a nation state recognizes that its military limitations prevent it from properly defending its geographic borders. The host nation’s request for support from the U.S. is typically an effort by the foreign country to develop its internal capacity to protect its people and limit internal or external threats. The security cooperation exercise Baltic Operation, held in Estonia, is an example of a foreign country using the resources 9 provided by the United States to improve its national defense capabilities in direct response to a perceived threat to its sovereign borders. In this scenario Estonia is attempting to develop its military capabilities and project an image of strength in an effort to maintain the freedom it earned, from Russia, at the conclusion of the Singing Revolution in 1992 and prevent a future Russian incursion across its borders. In contrast to this appropriate use and definition of security cooperation as a strategy to prevent conflict, the Obama Administration is using the term security cooperation as a way to define a national exit strategy from a two front war, a strategy that at its heart is based on the reconstruction of a damaged infrastructure. The false labeling of reconstruction operations as security cooperation is the foci of this thesis project.

#### It's strictly limited to DoD actions

Reynolds 19, et al, Commandant, Defense Institute of Security Cooperation Studies (Ronald, “The Management of Security Cooperation,” <http://cebw.org/images/docs/Legislacao_Webinar/Greenbook_39_0.pdf)>

Introduction to Security Cooperation

Introduction

The term security cooperation was first introduced in 1997 by the Defense Reform Initiative (DRI). At that time, the then named Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) already had day to day management responsibilities of many security assistance programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) and the Armed Export Control Act (AECA). The DRI proposed that DSAA also manage certain Department of Defense (DoD) funded international programs along with their personnel and associated resources. So that other U.S. government (USG) agencies, the private sector and foreign governments could better understand DSAA’s enlarged mission and diverse functions beyond security assistance (SA), DoD re-designated DSAA as the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) effective 1 October 1998.

In recent years, DSCA has absorbed management responsibilities for many DoD international programs. In addition, DSCA leads the broader USG security cooperation enterprise. However, many security cooperation programs continue to be managed by other elements of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the combatant commands (CCMDs) or the military departments (MILDEPs). What further complicated the management of security cooperation was that the in-country point of contact between the USG and the host nation generally is either the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) sponsored defense attaché office (DAO) or the DSCA sponsored security cooperation office (SCO). These two spigots for security cooperation with a country required a broad knowledge and skill baseline of the very different international programs that are initiated, funded, and managed throughout the DoD and its agencies and the MILDEPs. Most disconnects regarding SCO-DAO coordination of in-country security cooperation were generally resolved with the establishment of the Senior Defense Official-Defense Attaché (SDO/DATT) having oversight over both the SCO and DAO organizations. It was not until 9 June 2004 that DoD published a formal, yet still very broad, definition of security cooperation in Joint Pub 1-02:

All DoD interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation.

DODD 5132.03, DoD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation, 29 December 2016, further defines security cooperation with assigned responsibilities:

All DoD interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and partner nation military and security capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to allied and partner nations. This includes DoD administered security assistance programs.

#### Budget classification proves it’s military-to-military

Van Eerden 20, Captain (James, “Seeking Alpha in the Security Cooperation Enterprise A New Approach to Assessments and Evaluations,” Journal of Advanced Military Studies, 11.1)

The Fiscal Year (FY) 2019 President’s Budget: Security Cooperation Consolidated Budget Display outlines seven categories of security cooperation activity, including military-to-military engagements, support to operations, and humanitarian and assistance activities, among others.6 The security cooperation framework traditionally includes security assistance (SA), security force assistance (SFA), and some aspects of foreign internal defense (FID).7 In the context of this article, the term security cooperation refers primarily to military-to-military engagements, where the U.S. military engages in training partner forces under the auspices of Title 10 and Title 22 authorities.

### Do both – links to cp

#### Security Cooperation is exclusively funded by the Department of Defense, and Security Assistance is exclusively Department of State funding.

White 14, Major, USMC, a Joint Doctrine Development Officer with the Joint Staff J7 (Taylor, “Security Cooperation How It All Fits” *Joint Forces Quarterly*, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-72/jfq-72\_106-108\_White.pdf?ver=2014-03-13-152407-220)

Department of Defense (DOD) security cooperation activities support or are combined with other assistance programs and often are a part of nation assistance. This often occurs in a manner that may appear confusing or convoluted to the joint warfighter. This article portrays how the programs and activities converge. Although the various terms and activities in show in the accompanying figure appear to have simple names and meanings, they in fact have strict definitions based on funding and authorities. While some of the activities directly support one another, others have distinct boundaries between their definitions and functions. The joint community is beginning to address the framework of security cooperation in a new joint doctrine publication, Joint Publication (JP) 3-XX, *Security Cooperation*. It is important to embark with clear definitions and understanding of the complex relationship among these terms to facilitate understanding by the joint force.

Security cooperation is referred to in both joint professional military education programs and joint staffs as a tool to be employed by combatant commands. However, in other settings, it is a set of programs managed by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. Extensive review of joint doctrine and policy reveals that the definition of *security cooperation* appears to encompass these areas and more. After expanding our understanding of security cooperation, other terms such as *security force assistance, foreign internal defense,* and security assistance provide additional specificity for the tasks being conducted, yet some of these actions fall outside security cooperation. Even though security cooperation spans the range of military operations and is inclusive of large-scale operations conducted in support of foreign nations, it is not all-encompassing of security related support from U.S. agencies other than DOD.

Nation assistance is support rendered by foreign forces within another nation’s territory based on mutual agreements.1 While this term is used to describe the comprehensive approach to assisting other nations, the definition associated with nation assistance has two limitations: it does not encompass support to regional organizations, and it is only assistance by foreign forces. A better, broader term is *foreign assistance*, which is assistance to foreign nations ranging from the sale of military equipment to donations of food and medical supplies to aid survivors of natural and manmade disasters.2 When examining the current definitions for *foreign assistance* and *nation assistance*, we find significant overlap:

*Foreign assistance to foreign nations* [ranges] *from the sale of military equipment to donations of food and medical supplies to aid survivors of natural and man-made disasters. U.S. foreign assistance takes three forms: development assistance, humanitarian assistance, and security assistance.3*

This term is likely to resonate with the State Department, which has an Office of U.S. Foreign Assistance and a designated foreign assistance budget.

*Nation assistance—assistance rendered to a nation by foreign forces within that nation’s territory based on agreements mutually concluded between nations.4*

The term nation assistance is not often used in policy or strategy. For example, the current National Security Strategy mentions foreign assistance three times but does not use the term nation assistance. The first opportunity to create some clarity is to replace the term nation assistance with foreign assistance in the upcoming revisions of JP 3-0, Joint Operations, and JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense.

If foreign assistance were to replace nation assistance in joint doctrine, the definition would include that portion of security cooperation that falls outside the realm of nation assistance in figure 1. Foreign assistance then encompasses all of security cooperation and reduces some of the ambiguity. Security cooperation then focuses strictly on the DOD contribution to foreign assistance and encompasses all DOD interactions with foreign defense establishments to build both national and regional defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to host nations.5

Having addressed the larger constructs, it is possible to review and clarify the relationships between other programs and activities that occur within them. First is security assistance with a specific definition in relation to both DOD and State. It refers to a group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended. These programs are funded and authorized by State to be administered by DOD through the Defense Security Cooperation Agency.6 This is the process by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services. That portion of security assistance outside of security cooperation in figure 1 reflects State and other civilian agency involvement.

## Solvency

### Solvency – generic

#### Achieving consensus at NATO requires diplomatic, not military, efforts

Burns 21, Professor of Diplomacy and IR at Harvard (Nicholas, “A Time for Diplomacy,” *Belfer Center*, <https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/time-diplomacy)>

Diplomacy also works best when far-sighted leaders take charge of a crisis and point the way ahead. Think of: FDR and Churchill’s organization of a massive global coalition to defeat Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan. Helmut Kohl, Mikhail Gorbachev, and George H.W. Bush’s negotiations to unite Germany in the NATO Alliance and to end the Cold War. Nelson Mandela who used a four-year diplomatic negotiation to dismantle and destroy the apartheid regime. Angela Merkel who led the world diplomatically in confronting and sanctioning Vladimir Putin following Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014. Diplomacy and negotiations, of course, do not always succeed. At its worst, if diplomacy fails, war, lawlessness, and destruction ensue – Vietnam, Rwanda, and Iraq in the past. Syria, Tigray, Myanmar, and China’s power grab in the South China Sea in the present. That is one reason why it is so important to integrate effectively the work of ambassadors and Generals combined with the unique power of intelligence officers. Foreign policy making in the U.S. Government is a team sport. It takes coordination among all the country’s actors to succeed. We diplomats understand that our ability to succeed is often related directly to the intelligence on which we depend and the military partners with whom we share power. It has long been understood that diplomacy and defense are inextricably tied to each other. When I was U.S. Ambassador to NATO, the majority of my staff was from the Pentagon – both the uniformed military and Defense Department civilians. We thought hard about aligning our diplomatic moves with our military might. When we responded to the 9/11 attacks, we drew on the resources of both diplomats and warriors. When NATO went into Afghanistan, we thought of it as a combined military and diplomatic mission. What has been missing in the U.S. government in recent years is a strong, energetic, self-confident diplomatic corps. President Biden and Secretary of State Tony Blinken have shown they appreciate the need to elevate diplomacy as a first-order priority for the United States. From their first days in office, they have emphasized their determination to strengthen America’s diplomatic power in the world. President Biden chose the State Department as the site of his first foreign policy speech. Some of his earliest and most notable appointments immediately strengthened our diplomatic bench behind Secretary Tony Blinken – Ambassadors Linda Thomas-Greenfield, Wendy Sherman, Victoria Nuland, and Samantha Power, as well as an impressive and experienced NSC team led by Jake Sullivan, Jon Finer, Kurt Campbell, Laura Rosenberger, Sumona Guha, and many others. For President Biden’s new emphasis on diplomacy to succeed, however, the career Foreign Service, in particular, will need to be strengthened dramatically. It is no secret that the Foreign and Civil Service are at their lowest points in morale and effectiveness in the memory of anyone listening today in this Zoom room. I began my diplomatic career 41 years ago as an intern at our embassy in Nouakchott, Mauritania in the Sahara Desert. I have witnessed many highs and lows of American diplomacy since. Frankly, I have been shocked to see the damage done to the career Foreign Service during the last four years. The result is disastrously low morale, a lack of budgetary support, the debilitating departure of some of our most senior career diplomats, the sidelining of the Service for a time, and the resulting lack of confidence in its future by a younger generation of diplomats who will be most critical to its resurrection. President Biden and Secretary Blinken have a rare opportunity to lead a radical overhaul at the State Department. Under their leadership, this must remain a first-order priority for the administration. In November just following the Presidential election, two former American Ambassadors, Marc Grossman, Marcie Ries, and I released a Harvard Kennedy School report entitled, “A U.S. Diplomatic Service for the 21st Century.” Our goal was to recommend the fundamental steps necessary to reform the Foreign Service and to reposition it for success in the future. Based on conversations with over 200 people inside the U.S. government and beyond in over 40 workshops during the past pandemic year, we reported that the Foreign Service “is confronting one of the most profound crises in its long and proud history.” We recommended a determined, bipartisan effort to revive and restructure it. Specifically, we called for a new Foreign Service Act by Congress to set a renewed mission and mandate for the 21st century diplomatic corps. The last time Congress passed such an Act was in 1980 when the world was a very different place with very different challenges. than it is now. We advocated a “relentless focus on diversity” to counteract the woeful lack of progress in the percentage of African Americans, women, Latinx Americans, Asian Americans and other minorities in the senior ranks of American diplomacy. We called for the creation of a new Diplomatic Reserve Corps and a Mid-Level entry program to ensure the inclusion in the diplomatic ranks of experienced citizens with specialized skills. Given the proliferation of political appointee Ambassadors at the State Department, we also recommended that, by 2025, 90 percent of Ambassadors should be career appointees, not 70 percent as is the current practice. We also recommended that 75 percent of the powerful Assistant Secretary of State positions be held by career officers. During the Trump Administration, not a single one of these Assistant Secretary positions was led by a Senate-confirmed career officer. This was the first time in memory that the Foreign Service had been entirely unrepresented at that critical leadership level. Finally, we proposed to rename the “Foreign Service of the United States” the “United States Diplomatic Service.” We believe it signals transformation and reinforces the vital role our diplomats perform in service to our nation. This new title would begin with the two words, of course, that are most important – United States. A reinforced career diplomatic corps would help President Biden and his successors from either party to revive American leadership in the world. President Biden’s great insight has been to see our alliances as the critical asset we have in this long-term battle for global power and the future of democracy. The NATO Alliance is fundamental to a long-term peace in Europe. It has expanded a zone of security to encompass the great majority of Europeans, East and West. It protects all of us, particularly smaller countries, from the Russian Bear. It will be largely a diplomatic task to return the U.S. to leadership of the Alliance and to maintain allied unity in containing Russia power in the next few days, weeks, months, and years.

### Solvency – AI

#### State Department should be the central hub for all AI foreign policy

Dukeman 20, senior fellow at FP21 and a Ph.D. student at Princeton University, where he researches institutional reform in U.S. foreign policy agencies. He previously helped found the U.S. State Department’s Center for Analytics (Ryan, “WINNING THE AI REVOLUTION FOR AMERICAN DIPLOMACY,” *War on the Rocks*, https://warontherocks.com/2020/11/winning-the-ai-revolution-for-american-diplomacy/)

The State Department Should Lead on AI

Why is diplomacy — rather than defense or industrial policy — the right venue for advancing a digital democracy agenda, or something like it? Simply put, the multidimensional and transnational nature of AI requires an integrated, strategic approach, and diplomats are uniquely skilled in making policy across these issues more than the sum of their piecemeal parts. To channel former French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau, AI is too important to be left to the generals — or the technologists — alone. So far, most of the government’s focus on AI has been through research and development investments at the Defense Department, or through White House Office of Science and Technology Policy efforts to capitalize on it as an innovative economic windfall. Unfortunately, this approach — including leaving much of the intergovernmental norm-setting on AI to peer-to-peer military discussions — misses the strategic forest for the tactical trees. Issue-specific approaches that target global AI only as a military tool or an economic boon have two dangerous flaws: They largely ignore AI as a human rights issue, and forsake the potential for alliances and issue-linkage across policy areas. For example, existing efforts have failed to leverage U.S. technological leadership to advance global norms aligned with Western values, or to use foreign assistance to promote inclusive digital development at scale. The State Department’s diplomats maintain a comparative advantage over interagency peers in remedying exactly these flaws. Diplomats are skilled in dealing with crosscutting global problems, and well suited to play a leading, orchestrating role in advancing a concerted American vision for AI across its economic, security, and human rights aspects. In Washington, at their posts, and in multilateral organizations, diplomats spend much of their days integrating peer agencies’ competing perspectives to advance a concerted U.S. agenda; leveraging instruments of national power such as foreign aid, military assistance, or visa regulations to advance disparate goals across different issues; and negotiating in bilateral and multilateral fora on economic, political, human rights, and military matters. The State Department’s sustained leadership in international organizations, which will play a major role in digital technology governance, is an additional underutilized advantage. The White House is wrong not to include the State Department as a “key agency” in its strategy on AI. In fact, the department may be the keystone agency — linking disparate, issue-specific efforts together so the result is more than the sum of its parts.

#### State Department-led assistance solves AI rules-for-engagement and escalation

Blinken 21, US Secretary of State (“Secretary Antony J. Blinken at the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence’s (NSCAI) Global Emerging Technology Summit,” <https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-at-the-national-security-commission-on-artificial-intelligences-nscai-global-emerging-technology-summit/)>

We’re moving quickly, because we want to ensure that as AI and related technologies transform how we live, how we work, how we compete, how we defend ourselves, that we’re staying ahead of change, indeed that we are shaping change and, critically, making sure it delivers for our people. My colleagues, I think, have very capably covered the administration’s work on these issues as it relates to our domestic renewal, our economy, and our defense. So what I’d like to do today is to focus on the State Department’s distinct role, because diplomacy will be critical. Working with partners and allies to develop and deploy technology is going to help us tackle the most urgent challenges we face, from pandemics to the climate crisis. Diplomacy will also be essential to mitigating risks, from preventing cyber attacks that target our businesses, to regulating technology that threatens our privacy, to defending our democratic values and way of life. And let me just pause for a second on that last point, because I think it deserves emphasis. It’s fundamentally what’s at stake here. More than anything else, our task is to put forth and carry out a compelling vision for how to use technology in a way that serves our people, protects our interests and upholds our democratic values. It’s not enough to highlight the horrors of techno-authoritarianism, to point to what countries like China and Russia are doing, and say that it’s wrong and dangerous, even as it is. We’ve also got to make the positive case for our own approach, and then we’ve got to deliver. That is the challenge before us. We need the United States and we need its partners to remain the world’s innovative leaders and standard setters, to ensure that universal rights and democratic values remain at the center of all the innovation that’s to come, and that it delivers real benefits in people’s lives. That fundamentally is the test that we have to pass, and it’s a test I think you’ve heard President Biden allude to. In short, democracies have to pass the tech test together. And diplomacy, I believe, has a big role to play in that. Now, any time you hear someone from the State Department talking, we’re likely to throw in pillars and frameworks and tranches, so I can’t be any different today. We have to have our pillars, so let me walk you through six of them – (laughter) – that cover the approach to these issues. I know you’d be disappointed without it. The first is reducing the national security risks posed by malicious cyber activities and emerging technologies. This is the most basic thing our diplomacy has to do: protect our people, protect our networks, prevent conflict, and establish standards of responsible conduct in cyberspace. Already, we’ve brought countries together around an approach that recognizes international law to make it clear that countries are governed in cyberspace just like they are offline and that defines norms that apply not only in wartime but in peacetime too, because we’re now dealing with significant cyber incidents outside the context of war. We’ve also called for practical confidence-building measures; for example, steps as simple as establishing points of contact, so that in the event of a major cyber incident we actually know who to call. Under American leadership, UN member-states have come together repeatedly to reaffirm this basic framework. Now we’re working to bring allies and partners along to respond collectively when others engage in malicious cyber activity. That’s what happened after the SolarWinds intrusion. We attributed it to Russia; 22 countries, the European Union, NATO quickly supported that conclusion. And that’s important, because when we speak with one voice, we can more effectively deter future bad acts. Last month, as some of you will have noted, at the NATO summit, NATO reaffirmed that a cyber attack could trigger Article V – “an attack on one is an attack on all” – and that’s an important step too in deterring those attacks and protecting our national security in the cyber age. We’re also treating ransomware not only as a law enforcement issue but also as a national security issue. Ransomware and other cyber crimes affect all of us – our businesses, local governments; our most critical infrastructure, from power grids to hospitals. As you know, one in four Americans has been the victim of a cyber crime, at a cost of more than $4 billion every single year. That’s a direct threat to the safety, to the well-being of our people, and so it’s at the top of our diplomatic agenda. And it’s also why we’re elevating ransomware in our engagements with Russia. Our message is clear: Countries that harbor cyber criminals have a responsibility to take action. If they don’t, we will. We’re strengthening our diplomatic and foreign assistance tools to fight transnational cyber criminals, and we’re working to expand membership in the global cyber crime treaty known as the Budapest Convention. We’ll launch similar efforts on AI and other emerging technologies. If they’re going to be used as part of our national defense, we want the world to have a shared understanding of how to do that responsibly, in the same way that we’ve hammered out rules for how to use conventional and nuclear weapons. That’s how we reduce the risk of proliferation. It’s how we prevent escalation or unintended incidents.

### Solvency – cyber

#### The State Department is comparatively the best actor for leading cyber policy. They promote consensus with allies on norms, capacity building, intel-sharing and resilience

Williams 21, PhD, postdoctoral research fellow at the Center for Global Security Research (CGSR) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (BK, et al, “US and Allied Cyber Security Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific,” *Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory*, <https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1787217>)

The workshop's penultimate panel stressed a renewal of innovation in diplomatic practice. An active cyber diplomacy holds the promise of restoring stability to cyberspace, and, for the United States, advocating for a free, interoperable, and secure internet globally. State Department retains the bureaucratic competencies and personnel to enact forward-looking cyber diplomacy, but they have much ground to cover on norm construction, capacity building, and affirming that states follow international law in cyberspace. Diplomacy's most substantial roles are protecting an on-line ecosystem where human rights are respected, restoring stability by reducing incentives for states to act maliciously, and demonstrating U.S. leadership in digital rights and emerging technology. Cyber diplomats at the State Department and DHS cooperate with allies on publicly attributing blame for aggressive cyber acts to state-sponsored APTs. State Department is active in the UN's Group of Governmental Experts and Open-Ended Working Group, lobbying for an internet of information freedom rather than information control by states. Thus far, as one panelist emphasized, the State Department has not yet framed its cyber diplomacy efforts in the realities of the cyber strategic environment. The State Department can make strides in supporting Persistent Engagement by socializing foreign service officers and diplomats, who are the face of diplomacy, to the domain's competitive nature. Shaping international discourse on cybersecurity norms, responsible state behavior, and governance can be best attained by a corps of diplomats who are unified with the United States' cyber doctrine. Norm construction from the bottom up presents the best route to shape global norms. Leveraging agile coalitions of allies to build norms represents a workable solution to adversary intransigence at the UN. Values, by themselves, do not have the power to influence norms against concerted state pressures to assert authoritarian control over the internet. Competitive allied cyber diplomacy can shape the standards and norms that determine the future of the internet. A competitive cyber diplomacy relies on the State Department's core competency in creating bilateral and multilateral agreements for capacity building, threat intelligence sharing, resilience measures, and to promote best practices in a competitive cyber ecosystem. Diplomats understand countries' strategic and political environments, and the State Department has the capacity to scale Hunt Forward operations. USCC [US Cyber Command] encounters limits in growing Hunt Forward. Collaboration between the State Department and USCC may present the best avenue to consensually operate in other countries' networks to observe malicious actors. The State Department will guide the United States' cyber diplomacy, not USCC [US Cyber Command], and integrating cyber authorities will create synergies for how the United States can restore stability in cyberspace and safeguard the United States' cybersecurity.

#### DoS-led cyber initiatives solve ambiguity

Goldman 20, cyber strategist and cyber persistence subject-matter expert at U.S. Cyber Command and the National Security Agency. From 2018 to 2019, she was cyber adviser to the director of policy planning at the U.S. Department of State (Emily, “From Reaction to Action: Adopting a Competitive Posture in Cyber Diplomacy,” *Texas National Security Review*, 3.4)

The U.S. government needs to reach an interagency consensus on the preferred boundaries of acceptable behavior outside of armed conflict and promote them in international fora. The State Department is the natural leader for these efforts. Interagency discussions should proceed in tandem with consultations with the private sector. Currently, discussions with private sector entities all too often are isolated within individual agencies, with little coordination between agencies — even between the State Department and USAID. Agreed-upon conventions can then be reinforced by the actions of all departments and agencies. Working bilaterally, multilaterally, and through international institutions, the United States — led by the State Department — can influence and message what behaviors it views as unacceptable. This can help reduce the ambiguity that adversaries exploit, enhance the ability to build coalitions to support the U.S. view, and enable the United States to more effectively secure commitments from like-minded countries to impose consequences on those whose actions are counter to the principles.

### At: Military key

#### The DoS can work with defense agencies of foreign countries, and that’s NOT security cooperation

Tankel 20, Stephen Tankel, associate professor at American University, and an adjunct senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security, and Tommy Ross, non-resident senior associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020 (Stephen, “RETOOLING U.S. SECURITY SECTOR ASSISTANCE,” War on the Rocks, <https://warontherocks.com/2020/10/reforming-u-s-security-sector-assistance-for-great-power-competition/)>

The United States provides security sector assistance to foreign civilian and military forces, agencies, and institutions ranging from local law enforcement and judicial systems to standing militaries. This assistance is intended to strengthen U.S. access to key territories and facilities, shape partners’ national security decision-making and governance, and build their capacity and capabilities for use against shared threats and adversaries. It also promotes the U.S. defense industry via arms transfers, supports the infrastructure and operations of multilateral organizations such as NATO, and increases military interoperability. The State Department implements assistance across the entire security sector, including organizations responsible for defense, law enforcement, and security of key assets like ports and borders. The Department of Defense has a narrower mandate, and provides assistance to partner militaries under the umbrella of security cooperation. The Pentagon also engages in a range of other activities — combined exercises, staff talks, port visits, and officer exchanges — that fall under security cooperation as well. We use the term security sector assistance for simplicity, and distinguish where these additional security cooperation activities are relevant. The U.S. government does not typically define Foreign Military Sales as assistance, but we believe it should, and that it ought to factor Direct Commercial Sales into its assistance planning as well. Both types of sales can lead to sustained U.S. engagement with a partner in the form of training, maintenance, and sustainment for the purchased items.

#### Only non-military assistance promotes the trust necessary for Security Assistance to succeed

Stohl 16, senior associate with the Managing Across Boundaries Initiative at the Stimson Center (Rachel, “The Pitfalls of the Pentagon Taking the Lead on U.S. Security Assistance,” World Politics Review, https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/19963/the-pitfalls-of-the-pentagon-taking-the-lead-on-u-s-security-assistance)//BB

Oversight and transparency over these myriad programs are often extremely difficult. Numerous government accounts provide this money, and depending on the program, different congressional committees maintain oversight. The stove-piped nature of U.S. military assistance and the steadfast secrecy that surrounds decisions made for reasons of “national security” often create an artificial division between national security interests and foreign policy ideals. They also make it nearly impossible to identify the exact amount of spending, to evaluate the effectiveness and impact of various programs, and to avoid duplicating resources and efforts across different offices and agencies. This tension between the State Department and the Pentagon is not new. For decades, there have been contradictions between advancing U.S. security interest and foreign policy goals, such as the protection of human rights. Traditionally, the State Department was the primary decision-maker that determined who received security assistance and for what purpose. Yet all of that began to change after Sept. 11. Before 9/11, Congress had already begun authorizing the Pentagon to support foreign militaries in roles that had long been filled by the State Department. Starting with anti-drug training in the Western Hemisphere, the number and size of these programs has steadily grown since. In the aftermath of Sept. 11, the purpose of “train and equip” programs was altered to fill an expanding list of priorities to “build partner capacity,” known as BPC. A RAND Corporation study in 2013 found that of 184 unique authorities that underwrite 165 BPC programs, at least 70 are managed and can be utilized by the Pentagon to provide security cooperation. The mandates of these programs are vast, ranging from counterterrorism to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. After 9/11, the Defense Department created military assistance programs to supplement traditional State Department ones. But from the outset, the appropriated funds that support these programs were subject to fewer restrictions than their State Department counterparts. For example, the Pentagon’s Regional Defense Counterterrorism Fellowship Program was originally created in 2002 with a mandate that critics claimed served the same purpose as the State Department’s International Military Education and Training program. The Pentagon program provided nonlethal counterterrorism training, but lethal training was made available two years later. Beyond the lack of transparency and oversight, a larger and more philosophical concern is that foreign policy has become militarized. Similarly, in 2006, the Pentagon was authorized to use $200 million of its Operation and Maintenance funds to equip and train foreign militaries for counterterrorism operations. In creating these parallel training authorities and funding them through the defense budget, the Pentagon is, in effect, able to implement its security assistance without applying Foreign Assistance Act restrictions, which are intended to ensure that human rights and other foreign policy concerns are taken into consideration when determining the provision of security assistance. Experts have counted a tripling of military assistance out of the Pentagon budget from 2008 to 2015. That money comes with greater influence. And although the State Department can veto some programs, others are outside its authority, and program planning is not always shared with State Department personnel. After 9/11, the Pentagon gained a larger role, not just because it had the money, but because it was believed that it had the experience and means to react more quickly to changing situations and needs in an expansive and fast growing war on terror. While many of the countries receiving Pentagon military assistance are seen as national security priorities, their behavior often raises foreign policy concerns that make diplomatic engagement difficult. Providing arms to these countries also increases the risk that U.S.-origin weapons could be used against the United States, its soldiers, its allies and/or its interests. In many cases, military and security assistance is provided to achieve short-term security gains, which may undermine long-term U.S foreign policy interests. These issues are compounded by the fact that the Pentagon simply has more money and resources to address these concerns, and it has become easier for it to simply foot the bill. Pentagon spending on military assistance has totaled at least $122 billion since 2001, compared to approximately $119 billion for the State Department. The Security Assistance Monitor, a program of the Center for International Policy that tracks U.S. security assistance to countries around the world, has documented a tenfold increase in Pentagon security aid programs since 2001—from $1 billion in 2001 to $10.8 billion in 2015. State Department spending nearly doubled in that time from $4.6 billion to $8.3 billion. However, it is not the dollar figure that is worth comparing, but rather the meteoric rise of Pentagon spending, as opposed to a more gradual increase from the State Department. This increased spending has made some observers apprehensive. A Congressional Research Service report last May raised serious concerns about the roles of the State Department and the Pentagon with regard to security assistance and reconciling foreign policy objectives with security goals. It highlighted the lack of reporting requirements for Pentagon programs compared to the State Department and the resulting lack of oversight and accounting. In addition, Pentagon programs are not subject to country-by-country public reporting, making understanding a recipient country’s priorities, activities and funding impossible. At least 66 Pentagon programs do not allow any specific country information to be made available at all. Beyond this lack of transparency and oversight, a larger and more philosophical concern is that foreign policy has become militarized. Recipient countries and communities have the impression that help only comes from the U.S. military, which changes the context of assistance and the relationship with those receiving it. The mission and its perception differ depending on whether the help comes from the U.S. military, or instead from the U.S. Embassy, the United States Agency for International Development or other civil servants from various U.S. government agencies. Today, American security assistance has become unnecessarily military in nature, simply because there are additional Pentagon funds and programs that can quickly move money. At a fundamental level, when speaking with members of the U.S. military involved in these types of missions, such as building schools or bridges in African countries, they have recognized that they are simply there to complete their work and to strengthen military-to-military relationships. They often don’t worry about diplomatic aspects or the types of relationships they are establishing. To be sure, developing any relationship, particularly in countries with questionable and at times poor records of democracy and human rights, is important, and military relationships may buy the security that is desired in the short term. But in the long term, without deeper diplomatic relationships and nonmilitary engagement, it will be impossible to achieve larger strategic objectives and foster an environment of trust.

### At: State department ineffective

#### We’re overhauling and revitalizing diplomacy now – that makes the State Department effective

Blinken 21

(Antony J, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken on the Modernization of American Diplomacy”, 10/27, <https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-on-the-modernization-of-american-diplomacy/>) DB

So today, I’m pleased to share with you our plan to modernize the purpose and institution of American diplomacy. Some of our proposals are already being implemented; others will be rolled out soon. And as I said on Monday when I met with our chiefs of mission around the world and with department leaders, at every step, we want to hear from our people about how we can most effectively do the things that I’ll lay out today. There are, as with any good plan, a few pillars – five of them. First, we will build our capacity and expertise in the areas that will be critical to our national security in the years ahead, particularly climate, global health, cyber security and emerging technologies, economics, and multilateral diplomacy. This isn’t just a new list of priorities by a new administration. It reflects a significant reorientation of U.S. foreign policy that focuses on the forces that most directly and consequentially affect Americans’ lives, livelihoods, and security, and that will increasingly be at the heart of our alliances and partnerships, and core to our engagement with strategic competitors. On cyberspace and emerging technologies, we have a major stake in shaping the digital revolution that’s happening around us and making sure that it serves our people, protects our interests, boosts our competitiveness, and upholds our values. We want to prevent cyber attacks that put our people, our networks, companies, and critical infrastructure at risk. We want the internet to remain a transformative force for learning, for connection, for economic growth, not a tool of repression. We want to shape the standards that govern new technology, so they ensure quality, protect consumer health and safety, facilitate trade, respect people’s rights. We want to make sure the technology works for democracy, fighting back against disinformation, standing up for internet freedom, reducing the misuse of surveillance technology. And we want to promote cooperation, advancing this agenda tech by tech, issue by issue, with democratic partners by our side. All of this is work for American diplomacy. After an intense review led by Deputy Secretary Sherman and McKeon that included consultations with partners in Congress and outside experts, I intend, with the support of Congress, to establish a new bureau for cyberspace and digital policy headed by an ambassador-at-large, and to name a new special envoy for critical and emerging technology. Both will report to Deputy Secretary Sherman for at least the first year. We will also bring more specialized talent, including STEM expertise, to the department, and ensure that we’re developing expertise as well in these areas across the Foreign and Civil Service. By taking these steps, we’ll be better able to make sure that the United States remains the world’s innovation leader and standard setter. On global health security, we’re conducting a review to determine how the department can best lead on this issue. Stay tuned for the results there. It’s critical that we not only help end the COVID-19 pandemic, but also build back better global health security to prevent, to detect, and mitigate future pandemics. After the ordeal of the past 21 months, this is an opportunity and a responsibility that we must, and we will, seize. On climate, President Biden created the position of special presidential envoy for climate, and Secretary Kerry and his team are hard at work integrating climate diplomacy across the department. We’ve created new Foreign Service positions dedicated full time to climate issues, one in every regional bureau and in critical posts overseas, for example, in India and Brazil. And we’ll seek new funding to educate and train officers worldwide on climate diplomacy. Multilateral diplomacy – well, that’s diplo-speak for the need to cooperate with other countries to contend with the greatest challenges of our time, none of which we can tackle effectively alone. If we’re not engaged in international institutions, then we leave a void likely to be filled by others who may not share our values and interests, or no one steps up and we squander the benefits of collective action. And wherever and whenever new rules are being debated, for example, on how the global economy should work, how the internet should be governed, how our environment should be protected, how human rights should be defined and defended, American diplomats need to be at the table. So, we’re ramping up our expertise, our skills, and our training. And we’ve created a new office within the International Organizations Bureau with a single mandate to ensure that we and our closest partners can win elections to lead key institutions, be appointed to key bodies, serve in key positions across the United Nations, and push back against those looking to undermine the integrity of the international system that we help to build, to shape, and to lead.

#### Policy, not resources, is key

Burns 20

(William J, President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “The Damage at the State Department Is Worse Than You Can Imagine”, Atlantic, 3/12, <https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/03/how-rebuild-state-department/607837/>) DB

First, in much the same sense that Marshall’s concept relied on European self-help, State will have to show what it can do for itself, not just what the next president or Congress can do for it. Neither State nor other beleaguered institutions can simply wait for relief to be delivered. They’ll have to start by making the case themselves, through their own example, pursuing reforms that don’t initially require additional authorities or expenditure of political capital. At the State Department, these actions should include stripping away layers of bureaucracy, streamlining decision making, and pushing accountability and responsibility downward in Washington and outward to well-qualified ambassadors overseas. A reform effort will have to address the atrophy of tradecraft and core skills within the diplomatic corps, the shameful diversity deficit, and the lack of fluency in areas such as economics, climate change, and new technologies. Reform also means reshaping antediluvian approaches to leadership, management, recruitment, and performance, and most of all, rediscovering the honor and purpose exemplified by career professionals during the Trump impeachment hearings, and upholding that example even when inconvenient to professional progress. Second, sustaining that initiative will require rebalancing U.S. national-security tools—in both budget and policy terms. Much as Marshall appreciated the significance of priming the pump in Europe, a new administration and Congress will need to be supportive. Some of this will inevitably be financial, enough of a budgetary boost to allow a “training float” so that much more systematic professional training will be possible; to accommodate the return to service of some of those driven out in recent years; and to allow for the injection of talent and experience from key sectors, such as technology, where State lacks in-house expertise. Money isn’t the first or second answer to most needs at State, but it matters—especially at a moment when our greatest rival, China, has doubled spending on diplomacy. The most important rebalancing will be in policy, not resources. That begins with reemphasizing diplomacy as America’s tool of first resort and reversing the post-9/11 trend toward the militarization of foreign policy. The next administration should reverse the debilitating habit, far more pernicious in the Trump era than ever before, of filling unprecedented numbers of senior (and not-so-senior) jobs in Washington and ambassadorships abroad with political loyalists, many of whom have questionable qualifications and motivations. Finally, a renewed State Department will have to make a new effort to connect effectively not only with other parts of the executive branch and Congress, but also with the wider America it serves. Marshall and his colleagues spent time selling their recovery plan on the Hill and across the country. His successors understood the institutional challenge of making the case for American diplomacy, which lacks the natural constituencies of the U.S. military, and the political imperative for trying to do so. James Baker, who served as secretary of state under George H. W. Bush, titled his memoir The Politics of Diplomacy—he knew better than most that without a firmer political foothold, the State Department and the policies it seeks to implement would both suffer. Restoring American society’s faith in our foreign policy ought not be a lost cause today, given the increasing range of players, from governors and mayors to business executives and civil-society groups, who share a stake in disciplined American leadership around the world, and whose connection to the needs and aspirations of the middle class ought to inform the substance and conduct of our diplomacy. Building differently is about realizing that Washington does far too much preaching of the gospel of U.S. leadership to the American heartland, and not enough listening. If new leaders learn from past missteps, if they avoid the illusion of restoration to a normal that has long lost its normalcy, and if they approach the task of rebuilding with the mix of daring and humility that defines American diplomacy at its best, the State Department—and American institutions more broadly—can climb out of the deep hole it’s in, despite Trump’s furious excavation project.

#### Successful State diplomacy ensures future funding and political support

Burns and Linda Thomas-Greenfield 20

(William J, President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and Linda, Senior Vice President at the Albright Stonebridge Group, “The Transformation of Diplomacy: How to Save the State Department”, Foreign Policy, 9/23, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-09-23/diplomacy-transformation>) DB

CHANGE THAT LASTS Any effort to reform the State Department should start from within. It should focus in the first year of a new administration or a new term on what can be accomplished under existing authorities and without significant new appropriations. That is the moment of greatest opportunity to set a new direction—and the moment of greatest vulnerability to the habitual traps of bureaucratic inertia, overly elaborate and time-consuming restructuring plans, partisan bickering, and distracting forays into the capillaries of reform rather than its arteries. If the department can take the initiative and demonstrate progress on its own, that would be the best advertisement for sustained congressional support and White House backing for a new emphasis on diplomacy. It would be the best way to show that U.S. diplomats are ready to earn their way back to a more central role. It could help generate momentum for a rebalancing of national security budget priorities at a moment when U.S. rivals are not standing still; in recent years, the Chinese have doubled their spending on diplomacy and greatly expanded their presence overseas.

## Aff

### Perm Do Both

#### Military assistance does not trade off with State Department involvement

Early 11, Lt Col, USAF (Billie, “IMPLICATIONS OF THE MILITARIZATION OF US FOREIGN POLICY THROUGH SECURITY ASSISTANCE,” *Air War College*, <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1018707.pdf>)//BB

When the three indicators of militarization are applied to DOD’s security assistance efforts, results indicate that the United States relies heavily on DOD to pursue foreign policy objectives, but not at the expense of State Department responsibilities. DOD uses security cooperation to build relationships with partner nations and respond to humanitarian efforts, and uses security assistance as a flexible tool to build the capacity of foreign military forces so they can respond to threats in their regions before conditions require a greater US military response. Whenever possible, DOD proactively shapes the global security environment promoting US interests. DOD has the option to use its new Section 1206 authority to respond to urgent and emerging threats based on regional command priorities, or to influence longer-term State Department programs in support of country requirements. Also, DOD’s considerable force presence and commander influence can sway security assistance decisions favorably toward US interests. However, the State Department maintains a high degree of direct involvement and oversight in all security assistance decisions.

### Perm Do CP

#### Security cooperation includes the DOS

MAJ Nicholas R. Simontis, 13 - U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies United States Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas “SECURITY COOPERATION: AN OLD PRACTICE FOR NEW TIMES” <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA589722.pdf>

How we deal with our adversaries is changing in response to these developments in the security environment. How we deal with our international allies and partners also should change. For many years, the term “security cooperation” referred to efforts by the Department of Defense (DOD) to promote U.S. security interests through the interaction with and development of friendly and allied security capabilities.2 This definition is evolving, however, as illustrated by recent strategic documents and statements by the President and Secretary of Defense.3 The term as used recently includes synchronized efforts by the whole-of-government to build the security capacity of U.S. friends and allies, including the development of economic and political capabilities. The most recent strategic guidance calls for increased emphasis on an interagency and interorganizational approach to building partner capacity and capability, focused on promoting stability and preventing conflict before it begins, all within a framework that emphasizes governance and rule of law. Put another way, recent strategic guidance advocates a whole-of-government approach as the means for translating national security objectives into the outcome of increased partner capacity. This change represents recognition that a wide variety of skill sets is necessary to address these changes in the security environment. Unfortunately, this change presents challenges for current security cooperation practices.

The current structure of security cooperation, that is, the infrastructure of government agencies that participate in security cooperation activities, does not readily support this new guidance. The current security cooperation organization originated in the aftermath of World War II, and continued to evolve through the Cold War. Although the Department of State (DOS) has responsibility for planning and executing security cooperation, the system primarily addresses the military component of security in terms of equipment and training. The DOD, under the auspices of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) executes these portions of U.S. Security cooperation endeavors, which constitute the preponderance of efforts, both in terms of labor and fund allocation. Furthermore, the DOD’s share has grown considerably in the past five years as Congress significantly increased funding authorities in order to facilitate stabilization in Iraq and Afghanistan.4 The key issue, then, is how to shift the emphasis from the Department of Defense to efforts shared among Defense, State, USAID, and other agencies as needed.

#### State controls security cooperation – all DOD SC is carried out through embassies under direct supervision of State

Lieutenant Colonel Toney Filostrat and Lieutenant Colonel Elizabeth A. Medina, United States Army, 12 – paper written for the Harvard Kennedy School of Government National Security Fellowship Program (“SMART TOOLS: Integrating Security Cooperation and Foreign Assistance in a Period of Constrained Resources” <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA568436.pdf> **SC = Security Cooperation. SA = Security Assistance. FID = Foreign Internal Defense assistance**

Who Conducts Security Cooperation

The following paragraphs describe the key participants and stakeholders for planning and

managing SC activities at both the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.

Strategic / National Level

The National Security Council (NSC) generally provides the initial guidance and translation of national-level decisions pertaining to FID, SA, and SC. The Department of State (DoS) is generally the lead government agency for U.S. international affairs. The Secretary of State advises the President in forming foreign policy, including the national FID effort. The DoS assists the NSC in building national FID related policies and priorities, and is the lead government agency to carry out these policies. The DoS Policy Planning Staff, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM), and the new Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO) are the most involved with interagency planning for FID, SA, and SC. The Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security is the principal advisor and focal point for SA matters within DoS; control and coordination of SA extends from this office to the Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs. At the national level, the PM is the principal channel of liaison between DoS and DoD. Generally, DoS directs the overall U.S. Government (USG) SA program and DoD executes via SC programs and activities.

DoD Directive 5132.03, Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation, dated October 24, 2008, establishes DoD policy and assigns responsibilities under the GEF, which provides SC guidance to the GCCs, and titles 10 and 22 of the United States Code (USC), and statutory authorities, executive orders, and policies relating to the administration of SC, including SA programs authorized by the FAA and AECA, as amended. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy USD(P) serves as the principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary of Defense on all SC matters. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Global Security Affairs) establishes SA policy and supervises SA programs through the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA). The Secretaries of the Military Departments (MILDEPs) coordinate on SC policy guidance, campaign plans, and allocate resources to achieve SC objectives. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) provides implementation guidance for U.S. military plans and programs and provides the Secretary of Defense with military advice concerning SC.15

Operational and Tactical Level

The Director, DSCA, under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(P), directs,

administers, and provides DoD-wide guidance to the DoD Components and DoD representatives

to U.S. missions, for the execution of DoD SC programs for which DSCA has responsibility.

Other security SC programs are managed by other Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the

GCCs, or MILDEPs. Specifically, GCCs develop campaign plans to conduct SC programs and

activities in accordance with the GEF, and complete campaign plan and campaign support plan

assessments.16

The U.S. diplomatic mission to a host nation includes representatives of all U.S. departments and agencies physically present in a country. The President gives the Chief of Mission (COM), normally an ambassador, full responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all USG executive branch employees in country. The COM has authority over all USG executive branch employees within the mission and host country except for employees under the command of a U.S. military commander (Title 22, USC, Section 3927).17 The Senior Defense Official (SDO) or Defense Attaché (DATT) is the principal DoD official in a U.S. embassy, as designated by the Secretary of Defense. The SDO or DATT is the COM’s principal military advisor on defense and national security issues, the senior diplomatically accredited DoD military officer assigned to a diplomatic mission, and the single point of contact for all DoD matters involving the embassy or DoD elements assigned to or working from the embassy. In addition to being the diplomatically accredited DATT, the SDO is the chief of the Security Cooperation Organization (SCO) within the Country Team. The SCO includes all DoD elements located in a foreign country with assigned responsibilities for carrying out SA and SC management functions under titles 22 and 10 USC. SCOs typically include military assistance advisory groups, military missions and groups, offices of defense and military cooperation, liaison groups, and defense attaché personnel designated to perform security assistance/cooperation functions.18

#### Substantial security cooperation is funded and controlled by State

Lieutenant Colonel Toney Filostrat and Lieutenant Colonel Elizabeth A. Medina, United States Army, 12 – paper written for the Harvard Kennedy School of Government National Security Fellowship Program (“SMART TOOLS: Integrating Security Cooperation and Foreign Assistance in a Period of Constrained Resources” <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA568436.pdf> **SC = Security Cooperation. SA = Security Assistance. FID = Foreign Internal Defense assistance**

Significant portions of U.S. military security cooperation are funded as foreign assistance activities managed by the Department of State, and appropriated by Congress. With the amount of funding in the Defense appropriations bills, it’s not common knowledge that these military programs are funded under DoS budget authorities. The State Department has always taken its lead role on foreign assistance seriously, as a significant foreign policy tool. Over the past ten years, DoS focused on substantial internal reforms including foreign assistance planning and implementation. The U.S. government struggles to prepare for a future of persistent conflict and budget constraints. It is important to solidify reforms and institutionalize the integrating actions planned in the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review and the 3D Planning Framework to implement effective and efficient foreign assistance activities.

### No Solvency – generic

#### The Department of State is structurally inept and incapable at effective diplomacy

Zeya and Finer 20, \*American diplomat who has served as the Under Secretary of State for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights in the Biden Administration since July 2021, \*\*American journalist and diplomat who serves as Deputy National Security Advisor under National Security Advisor (Uzra and Jon, “Revitalizing the State Department and American Diplomacy,” *Council Special Report* No. 89)//BB

It has become an article of faith among policymakers that principled American leadership has waned but remains in demand around the world. Moreover, America’s network of international relationships is its foremost strategic asset, even as the agency charged with advancing U.S. interests through diplomacy—the Department of State (DOS)— has fallen into a deep and sustained period of crisis. However, there is a third framing assumption: that the current crisis offers an opportunity to address this predicament and revitalize American diplomacy. Despite the decades-long failure to implement essential reforms—and even in the face of sustained hostility from the current administration—diplomacy remains the best tool the United States has to advance its foreign policy interests. The role of the State Department has received heightened attention amid the onslaught it has suffered under the Donald J. Trump administration, which has treated American diplomats and diplomacy with a mix of neglect and disdain. But many of the challenges facing the DOS have existed for decades. Deficits in diversity, institutional culture, and professionalization are endemic to the State Department as an institution, and a diminished policy role for career officials persisted under previous administrations. Too often, leaders from both major parties have taken public support for U.S. leadership in the world for granted without making a strong enough case to the American public for why it is essential. Concrete steps can, and should, be taken solely through executive action in the first year of an administration committed to revitalizing American diplomacy, with thought to cementing change through legislation. The most pressing challenges facing the State Department include a twenty-first-century policy environment that has, in some priority areas, evolved beyond the core competencies of most Foreign and Civil Service officers and an institution hollowed out by three years of talent flight, mired in excessively layered structure, and resistant to reform. Perhaps most important, they include the multigenerational challenge of a diplomatic workforce that falls woefully short of reflecting the diverse country it serves, particularly at the senior-most ranks, compromising its effectiveness and fostering a homogeneous and risk-averse culture that drives out rather than cultivates fresh perspectives. The State Department today risks losing the “war for talent,” not only to the private sector but increasingly to other government agencies, due to inflexible career tracks, self-defeating hiring constraints, and a lack of commitment to training and professional development. Finally, DOS is hampered by Congress’s failure over many years to pass authorizing legislation, leading to budgetary pressures and diminishing DOS’s status in the hierarchy of national security agencies rather than reinforcing the nation’s paramount foreign policy institution.

### No Solvency---Risk Aversion/Resources

#### Risk aversion and understaffing decimates solvency

David, Acosta and Krohley 21, Colonel Arnel P. David is a US Army strategist assigned to the NATO Allied Rapid Reaction Corps. First Sergeant Sean A. Acosta is a civil affairs noncommissioned officer, and was the US Army’s 2018 NCO of the year. Dr. Nicholas Krohley is the principal of FrontLine Advisory. (“GETTING COMPETITION WRONG: THE US MILITARY’S LOOMING FAILURE,” *Modern War Institute*, <https://mwi.usma.edu/getting-competition-wrong-the-us-militarys-looming-failure/>)//BB

At present, we are engaged in global competition with China (and, to a much lesser extent, Russia). We are engaged in a regional contest with Iran. Global jihadist networks remain a potent threat. That said, we do ourselves a devastating disservice when we approach the rest of the world on the basis of its utility in these contests. American policy in Ukraine is downstream of our rivalry with Russia. The same is true for our engagement in Iraq with respect to Iran, and across much of the Global South vis-à-vis China. We instrumentalize bilateral relationships with smaller powers in pursuit of advantage against our rivals, while neglecting the local details that define the strategic landscape. This instrumentalization is readily apparent to those on the receiving end, provoking cynicism and frustration from Kyiv to Baghdad and beyond. Ultimately, it is exploitative and self-defeating—just as it was during the Cold War, when this same mentality led us to disaster from Vietnam to Nicaragua. The new great game will be won or lost based, above all else, on contextual understanding, partnerships, and alliances. It is not America’s responsibility to solve intractable problems in distant lands. However, we absolutely must understand said problems (as we have demonstrably failed to do over the past twenty years), so that we might manage our entanglements and the expenditure of finite resources. Across much of the globe, this task falls to the US military. The Department of State is understaffed, and isolated from ground truth by crippling risk aversion. The intelligence community’s priorities lie elsewhere. From sub-Saharan Africa to the South China Sea, the military is often our principal point of contact with contested terrain.

#### The military doesn’t suffer from the same resource shortages that the State Department does

Serafino 8, Coordinator and International Affairs Specialist at CRS (Nina, “The Department of Defense Role in Foreign Assistance: Background, Major Issues, and Options for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA493001.pdf>)//BB

In addition to its regional advantage, DOD enjoys two other advantages: greater planning and execution capabilities, and substantially greater budgetary resources. DOD can muster more [hu]manpower than any other agency. While U.S. military personnel may be stretched in wartime, there still exist substantial reserves of personnel that can be tapped to plan and carry out activities. The combatant commands enjoy considerably more personnel than do individual embassies, and their personnel are oriented toward planning activities, whereas State Department personnel are oriented toward collecting information and furthering U.S. policy through diplomacy, such as person-to-person contact. Despite waging a war in Iraq, CENTCOM created a new Joint Task Force in the Horn of Africa (CJT-HOA) of roughly 2,000 U.S. military personnel (the number fluctuates regularly) to plan and carry out efforts in the Horn of Africa that include much foreign assistance activity. In Iraq, DOD temporarily provided military personnel to fill about 100 State Department PRT posts, until the State Department could contract persons with the needed expertise to fill them.

### No Solvency---Political Backlash

#### Diplomatic assistance causes political backlash---that wrecks solvency

Kralev 20, Executive Director @ WIDA, The Washington International Diplomatic Academy (WIDA) is an independent organization that provides practical professional training in diplomacy and international affairs — both in person and online — to students, recent graduates and professionals in government, NGOs and the private sector (Nicholas, “Why Politicians Don’t Trust Diplomats,” Washington International Diplomatic Academy, <https://diplomaticacademy.us/2020/06/14/kralev-why-politicians-dont-trust-diplomats/)//BB>

So politicians’ lack of trust in the Foreign Service is based on perceptions that are largely divorced from reality. Like most Americans, they know very little about our diplomats. In a challenge to such a conclusion, previous administrations have often pointed to entrusting a few senior Foreign Service officers, including William J. Burns and Thomas R. Pickering, with top State Department posts as an example of the respective president’s reliance on professionals. That may speak of these officers’ capabilities, but it doesn’t make up for sidelining or ignoring the service as an institution. At least Bush and Obama understood that having held a prominent position under an administration of the other party is also a part of a career diplomat’s job. For example, Bush appointed R. Nicholas Burns ambassador to NATO and later undersecretary of state, even though Burns had been State Department spokesman under Clinton. And Obama appointed Victoria Nuland an assistant secretary of state despite her earlier role as a close adviser to Dick Cheney, Bush’s vice president. In contrast, Trump has retaliated against officers who held key positions during the Obama administration. Politicians’ decades-long distrust of the Foreign Service has significantly undermined the authority of the professionals and ultimately weakened U.S. diplomacy globally. The very real danger that there won’t be enough properly trained diplomats to restore America’s clout in the future worries us at the independent Washington International Diplomatic Academy. So much so that, although we were set up to offer short-term courses, we’ve decided to start a one-year post-graduate practical training program for people who aspire to become diplomats — the first such effort outside government. Our instructors, all former senior Foreign Service officers, have a lot to teach.

### No Solvency---Trust

#### Military-to-military contacts are necessary to build trust and avoid miscalculation

Ebitz 19, graduate of the Federal Bureau of Investigation National Academy, and holds master’s degrees in Military Studies, from the U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College, and Strategic Studies, from the U.S. Marine Corps War College (Amy, “The use of military diplomacy in great power competition,” Brookings Institute, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/02/12/the-use-of-military-diplomacy-in-great-power-competition/)//BB>

Within the main elements of national power (diplomacy, informational, military, and economic, or DIME), the military is often considered the last resort. However, the U.S. military has been a key player in, for instance, the spread of democracy, building partner countries’ strength through military-to-military relationships (including in the form of bi- and trilateral exercises to support standing Operation Plans, NATO, the United Nations, and Theater Security Cooperation), personnel exchange, and humanitarian assistance operations. Through these efforts, among others, the U.S. military helps to carry out the diplomatic mission of the United States (military diplomacy paved the way for NATO, the European Union, and the World Trade Organization, for instance). When military units participate in bilateral or multilateral exercises with other countries, for example, the purpose is several-fold: The interaction increases interoperability between the militaries, provides for cultural exchange and understanding, and offers an opportunity to expand each nation’s capabilities while exercising potential contingencies. The importance of military diplomacy in foreign engagement is to build dialogue that may facilitate further communication and, during a crisis, avoid confusion between cultures.

#### The DoD is best for improving strong relationships with host countries

Karlin 22, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities (Mara, “Examining U.S. Security Cooperation and Assistance,” Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee)//BB

Our relationships provide us with a reservoir of strength. They allow us to operate by, with, and through our allies and partners to meet shared security challenges. The degree of partnership should not be measured by the quantity of security cooperation programs, but rather by their quality. The Department of Defense has learned from large-scale assistance programs that for lasting impact, a comprehensive engagement plan involves more than training and equipping. Importantly, we are building a culture of learning and adaptation, drawing on lessons from program successes, as well as, from programs that did not have the desired impact. We are building a learning agenda and integrating it into decision processes, and measure program impact in a way that assesses real change, rather than counting our own inputs into programs as successes in themselves. We seek to learn lessons and avoid the fallacy of sunk costs by ruthlessly prioritizing programs that are strategic, and setting appropriate expectations for programs that provide more of a tactical advantage. Through this approach, we can unlock the comparative advantages our allies and partners bring as we collectively work together to meet our shared objectives.